ROWLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

9/7/2022 8:23 PM

A QUARTERBACK, A SNAPCHAT, AND THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT LAW ON THE INTERNET

Thomas A. Rowland*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Justin Goldman took a photo on Snapchat of Tom
Brady—then the quarterback of the New England Patriots—and
Danny Ainge—then the General Manager of the Boston Celtics—
while in the Hamptons. 1 Goldman then uploaded the photo to
his Snapchat story. 2 From there, the photo went viral, ultimately
ending up on several Twitter account profiles and several news
websites, including The Boston Globe, and Breitbart News. 3 The
sports world began to speculate that Brady was meeting with
Ainge in an attempt to entice National Basketball Association
star, Kevin Durant, to come to play for the Boston Celtics. 4 While
this may sound like the plotline of an ESPN “30 for 30,” it
became the impetus for a case that sent shockwaves through
copyright jurisprudence.
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Michael Wuest, Bryan Castro, and Hyisheem Calier; and my Law Review
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1
Kai Falkenberg, Settlement of Suit Over Tom Brady Photo Leaves Major
Online Copyright Issue Unresolved , FORBES (May 29, 2019, 4:46 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kaifalkenberg/2019/05/29/settlement-of-suit-over-tombrady-photo-leaves-major-online-copyright-issue-unresolved/#663c845f5695.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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To use the Internet in the twenty-first century is to share
content. There are two technological components to content
sharing. The first is called “framing,” which refers to “the
process by which information from one computer appears to
frame and annotate the in-line linked content from another
computer.” 5 This process is seen when one views a full-sized
image on a search engine; it appears that the image is set on the
website that the user is viewing, but it actually is mirroring
information from a third site. 6 Framing can also be seen when
one embeds content from a third source onto their own webpage
or content, such as a retweet on Twitter. 7
The second
technological component of content sharing occurs when the
webpage sharing the framed content goes through a process
called “in-line linking,” to instruct the browser to “incorporate
content from different computers into a single window.” 8
One need not have any social media accounts to come across
framed content. It is commonplace now for online news articles
to frame individuals’ Twitter posts to display reactions to topics
including sports,9 politics, 10 and even news from the President of
the United States. 11 News sources will frequently frame social
media posts into their own articles, allowing the viewer to observe
the original content in the context of the news sources’ article; if
the reader so desires, they may click on the framed content to go
to the original source directly. 12 Even more common than
framing content in articles is the use of news aggregation
services, where a website or search engine compiles the links of
various news sources and frames them within its own news

Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.01(A)(2)(b) (2020).
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9
Ali Thanawalla, Giants, MLB Twitter Reacts to Dodger’s Game 4 Loss to
Rays, YAHOO!SPORTS (Oct. 25, 2020, 11:14 PM), https://perma.cc/L2J6-EFUC?type
=image.
10
Emma Specter, Twitter Had Plenty of Thoughts on the Vice-Presidential
Debate, VOGUE (Oct. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/NZK3-FTU4?type=image.
11
Mike Isaac, How Facebook and Twitter Handled Trump’s ‘Don’t Be Afraid
of Covid’ Post, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/9EKZ-9PCE?type=
image.
12 Thanawalla, supra note 9; Specter, supra note 10; Isaac, supra note 11.
5
6
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section.13 News companies are certainly not the only Internet
users that partake in framing and linking, as individuals on their
own social media accounts frequently do the same. It is the
essence of the modern Internet that content is easily distributed.
Naturally, the sharing of another author’s works gives rise to
copyright questions, such as whether it is an infringement of the
author’s exclusive rights to display their work through framing. 14
From 2007 until Goldman’s Snapchat in 2016, courts generally
held that in-line linking and framing were not infringements of
copyright as long as the one sharing did not download the
content and repost it as his or her own. 15 In recent years,
however, this doctrine, called the “Server Test,” has been called
into question, culminating in the holding in Goldman’s lawsuit
that the news outlets that embedded tweets featuring Goldman’s
photo violated his copyright interests in the photo. 16 The dispute
over the status of the doctrine invites the question of whether an
individual can be held liable for embedding another’s content,
and its resolution may have serious implications for one of the
most commonplace activities on the Internet. 17
In Part II, this Comment will analyze the jurisprudence of
the Server Test and its rise and fall in utilization. Part III will
analyze the various approaches that may be employed in moving
away from the test. Part IV will discuss the implied license
doctrine and anti-circumvention measures, how they are used on
the Internet, and how they can be used to balance the interests of
original authors and those wishing to share content on the
Internet. This Comment will conclude by arguing that a
continuation of the implied license doctrine with anticircumvention measures is the best way to address
13
See, e.g., Search Results for “COVID-19”, GOOGLE NEWS (Jan. 5, 2021, 9:23
AM), https://perma.cc/KGH5-84CQ.
14
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder, including the right to display the work).
15 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007).
16
Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 596
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). The Court found that it was immaterial that the embedded Tweet
itself was on the server and belonged to an unrelated third-party; the defendants
were still held liable for infringement. Id. at 586.
17 Krista L. Cox, Does Sharing a Link to Online Content Amount to Copyright
Infringement?, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 2, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/
2017/11/does-sharing-a-link-to-online-content-amount-to-copyright-infringement/.
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copyrightability in the rapidly changing world of the Internet.
II.

THE SERVER TEST: PERFECT TEN AND GOLDMAN

The Server Test has its origins in the Ninth Circuit case,

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc . 18 The plaintiff, Perfect Ten,

was an adult entertainment company that presented photos of
naked models. 19 The company offered a subscription that
allowed users to access additional photos in a “member’s area.” 20
Image results on Google framed photos that were not in the
member’s area, but still on Perfect 10’s website, on Google’s
results page. 21 After a while, though, the results began to frame
photos that were originally in Perfect 10’s member section but
were posted without permission on third-party websites.22 This
meant that when a user clicked the thumbnail on the image
results page, their browser would frame an image from the
infringing website, not that of Perfect 10. 23 The issue presented
to the Ninth Circuit was whether Google and Amazon—which
had an image results page of its own powered by Google 24—could
be enjoined from “copying, reproducing, distributing, publicly
displaying, adapting or otherwise infringing” photographs from
Perfect 10’s website by linking to a third-party website that
provides the full image without authorization.” 25
In interpreting this question, the Perfect 10 court discussed
the Server Test, describing it as:
[A] computer owner that stores an image as
electronic information and serves that electronic
information directly to the user (‘i.e., physically
sending ones and zeroes over the [I]nternet to the
user’s browser’) is displaying the electronic
information in violation of a copyright holder’s
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1157.
Id.
Id.
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exclusive display right. Conversely, the owner of a
computer that does not store and serve the
electronic information to a user is not displaying
that information, even if such owner in-line links to
or frames the electronic information.26
In other words, linking and framing a photo, especially on a
search engine, is not copyright infringement. If the person
sharing the content, however, downloads the photo and then
reposts it as their own, then he or she is infringing a copyright.
This concept can be contextualized as the difference between
retweeting an individual’s Twitter post with a photo and saving
the photo from the original post and attaching it to a separate,
new tweet. 27 In applying the Server Test, the court examined the
definition of “display,” 28 “copies,” 29 and “fixed” 30 under the
United States Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”).31 In
examining these definitions, the Perfect 10 court determined that
Id. at 1159 (citing Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 839 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (internal citations omitted)).
27 See generally Retweet FAQs: What is a Retweet?, TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 3:51
PM), https://perma.cc/BQK9-2NZR; How To Post Photos or GIFs on Twitter,
TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:41 PM), https://perma.cc/8GAH-HXEZ (providing
instructions for posting photos on Twitter).
28
17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To ‘display’ a work means to show a copy of it, either
directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process
or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual
images nonsequentially”).
26

29

Id.

“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which
a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term “copies” includes the material object, other
than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.

30

31

Id.

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority
of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for
purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160.
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an image stored on a computer constitutes a copy of the work,
pursuant to the Copyright Act and, as such, copying the work
occurs when the data—the “ones and zeroes”—is transferred
from the storage of one computer to the storage of another. 32
According to the court, Google did not infringe on Perfect 10’s
exclusive right to display the full-sized versions of Perfect 10’s
copyrighted photos because the photos were not fixed on a
Google-owned and operated hard drive. 33 This is the Server Test
in its purest form being used to exonerate a search engine for its
framing.34
The Server Test was the prevailing standard for
approximately a decade until the Southern District of New York
addressed the issue of Justin Goldman’s photo of Tom Brady in
the decision of Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC. 35
There, in a claim for infringement of Goldman’s display rights,
the plaintiff argued that “he never publicly released or licensed
his photograph [of Tom Brady].” 36 The defendants did not save
the original photo from Goldman’s Snapchat story on their own
computers; the photo was stored on servers owned and operated
by several social media sites, including Snapchat, Reddit, and,
Twitter—which were not parties in the case.37 The defendants
only framed the plaintiff’s photo from those sources on their own
respective websites. 38 Therefore, the defendants argued on
32
33

Id. at 1159–60.
Id. at 1160; 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Server Test was only applicable to the full-

sized versions of the photos that appear on the screen when a user clicks on a
photo’s thumbnail. The thumbnails themselves were stored on Google’s servers,
and thus constituted a prima facie case of infringement. The court, however, found
that the thumbnails constituted a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107; Perfect 10, 508
F.3d at 1160, 1163–69.
34 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162.
35
Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, S.D.N.Y.
2018); Falkenberg, supra note 1.
36 Goldman, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 586; 17 U.S.C. § 106.
37 Goldman, 302 F. Supp 3d at 586. Several individuals did save and repost the
photo on their respective Twitter accounts. Id.; see, e.g., Bobby Manning
(@RealBobManning), TWITTER (Jul. 2, 2016 3:25 PM), https://twitter.com/
realbobmanning/status/749323081953533952?lang=en (providing an example of
one of the Tweets). Several defendants settled after a dismissal of summary
judgment, and the case was voluntarily dismissed for the two remaining defendants
(Oath and Heavy.com) after Goldman determined that the matter was “‘no longer
worth litigating.’” Falkenberg, supra note 1.
38 Goldman, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 587.
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motion for partial summary judgment that they were “simply
provid[ing] ‘instructions’ for the user to navigate to a third-party
server on which the photo resided.” 39 As such, the defendants
contended that the Server Test should apply and protect them
against any claim of infringement. 40 Writing as amicus in support
of the plaintiffs, various media photographic societies and
associations wrote to the court warning that adoption of the
broad Server Test would have a “‘devastating’ economic impact
on photography and visual artwork licensing industries,”
eliminate any incentives to pay a licensing fee as a website, and
thus “‘deprive content creators of the resources necessary to
invest in further creation.’” 41
With the amici’s concerns in mind, Judge Forrest, writing for
the Goldman court, rejected the defendants’ invocation of the
Server Test, citing the string of scattered caselaw on the subject
that illustrated a growing hesitancy by some courts to apply the
test. 42 Then, Judge Forrest considered the legislative history,
agreeing with the plaintiff that the Copyright Act’s plain
language, coupled with subsequent jurisprudence from the
Supreme Court, provides no basis for a rule that “the physical
location or possession of an image [may be used] to determine
who may or may not have ‘displayed’ a work within the meaning

39
40
41

Id. at 593.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 593. The organizations that wrote as amicus included: “Getty Images,

the American Society of Media Photographers, Digital Media Licensing Association,
National Press Photographers Association, and North American Nature
Photography Association.” Id. at 593 n.5.
42 See id. at 591–92 (citing Flava Works, Inc v. Gunter, 2011 WL 3876910, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (“In our view, a website’s servers need not actually store a
copy of the work in order to ‘display’ it.”)), (citing Live Face on Web, LLC v. Biblio
Holdings LLC 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124198 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016)
(questioning whether there was valid authority to apply any version of the Server
Test)), (citing Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (stating that the displaying “photographic images on a computer may
implicate the display right, though infringement hinges, in part, on where the
image was hosted” before denying summary judgment) (internal emphasis
omitted)), (citing MyPlayCity, Inc v. Conduit Ltd., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47313
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (stating defendant cannot be liable because plaintiff’s
server was what disseminated copies of its copyrighted games)), (citing Pearson
Education, Inc. v. Ishayev, 963 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (relying on Perfect
10 to hold that standard text hyperlinks were not use of infringing content)).
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of the Copyright Act.” 43 In support of its conclusion, the court
looked to the definition of “display,” under Section 101 of the
Copyright Act, finding the statutory language of “by means of
any device or process” material to the operative text. 44 The same
section of the Copyright Act defines a “device,” “machine,” and
“process” to be “one[s] now known or later developed.” 45 The
court found the definition to connote a broader interpretation of
“display,” meaning that the Perfect 10 court’s narrower reading
was insufficient for modern uses of the Internet. 46 Instead,
embedding a link on a website belonging to a defendant is an
affirmative step that is taken to accomplish transmission. 47
Therefore, this constitutes a “process” under Section 101. 48
The Goldman court finished its analysis by noting that parts
of the Copyright Act contemplate that displaying a work could
occur without possessing the work itself.49
For example,
Section 110(5)(A) exempts from liability small businesses that
turn on radios or televisions for the entertainment of their
customers.50 Such an exemption being considered necessary,
when it is clear that merely turning on a radio or television is not
making or storing a copy, shows that the drafters of the
Copyright Act did not believe that a copy must be made or stored
in order to display a work. 51 Examining the alternative, Judge
Forrest stated that even if making or storing a copy were
required, the Perfect 10 court only applied the Server Test in the
context of Internet search engines. 52 Nothing suggests that this
doctrine must be extended to any defendant that is not a search
engine, such as a news website. 53 The court concluded that “when
defendants caused the embedded Tweets to appear on their
43
44

Id. at 593.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101, (defining “display”)).

17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “device,” “machine,” or “process”).
Goldman, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
47 Id. at 594.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 595.
50 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A)).
51 Id.
52 Goldman, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 595–96.
53
Id. at 596. Judge Forrest, despite analyzing the alternative, reaffirmed her
stance that the doctrine is not “adequately grounded in the text of the Copyright
Act.” Id.
45
46
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websites, their actions violated the plaintiff’s exclusive display
right; the fact that the image was hosted on a server owned and
operated by an unrelated third party (Twitter) does not shield
them from this result.” 54 As a result, summary judgment was
granted in favor of Goldman, disrupting the copyright world’s
understanding of framed content. 55
In 2019, the Northern District of California—within the
same circuit as Perfect 10—further confounded the legal
authority of the Server Test in the case of Free Speech Sys., LLC
v. Menzel. 56 There, the original author, Peter Menzel, took
photographs of weekly food purchases made by families around
the world and published them in a book titled: Hungry Planet:
What the World Really Eats. 57 He registered a copyright for the
book. 58 Some of the photos were then posted on his website with
licenses to media outlets that required “a textual credit or
metadata reflecting the authorship and ownership.” 59 In other
words, Menzel’s license required that he receive photo credit if
someone used his work. Free Speech Systems (“FSS”) is the
owner of InfoWars, a right-wing conspiratorial news outlet run by
Alex Jones. 60 FSS took the photos from Menzel’s book and
posted them on InfoWars’ website in a post called “Amazing
Photos Show What the World Really Eats.” 61 Menzel did not
provide prior authorization for this post, and while InfoWars
attributed the photographs to Menzel’s book, it did not credit
Menzel directly. 62

54
55
56

2019).

Id. at 586.
Id. at 596; Falkenberg, supra note 1.
See Free Speech Sys., LLC v. Menzel, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1162 (N.D. Cal.

Id. at 1166.
Id.
59 Id.
60
Id. at 1167.; see About Alex Jones, INFOWARS, (Jan. 7, 2021, 12:52 PM),
https://perma.cc/K86M-XRJF; see also Don’t Get Fooled By These Fake New Sites,
57
58

CBS NEWS, (Jan. 7, 2021, 1:02 PM), https://perma.cc/QTN6-9FTV.
61 Free Speech Sys, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 1167.
62

Id.
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In denying FSS’s motion to dismiss Menzel’s claim of direct
infringement, the Menzel court did not apply the Server Test,
stating that it chose not to do so because FSS did not present any
Ninth Circuit case that applied the test outside of the context of
Internet search engines. 63 The court further explained that, even
if the test were applicable in this context, the caselaw was
insufficient to take judicial notice of the fact that the “underlying
code” pointed solely to Menzel’s website, and the images were
not saved on the servers of InfoWars. 64 Therefore, the Server
Test was unavailable to FSS as a defense against direct
infringement. 65 Menzel is significant because it shows that the
Server Test faces scrutiny in the very circuit it was conceived.
Furthermore, it shows the weakened status of the doctrine’s
application in modern jurisprudence.
III.

REPLACING THE SERVER TEST

The arguments addressed by the amici in Goldman are
contentious in the world of the Internet. 66 It is a challenge for
legislators to find a way to balance the exclusive rights of authors
with the interest of sharing content on the Internet. 67 This issue
is not unique to the United States. The European Union (“EU”),
for example, implemented measures that avoid forcing courts to
run an analysis that would resemble the Server Test in its recent
passage of the Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Digital Single Market . 68 This directive represents a view that is
significantly more pro-author to the detriment of users and
sharers.69 Article 15, for example, requires that EU Member
States shall “provide that the authors of works incorporated in a
press publication receive an appropriate share of the revenues
that press publishers receive for the use of their press
63
64

Id. at 1172.
Id.

65 The court did grant FSS’s motion to dismiss on a contributory infringement
claim. Id. at 1173.
66
Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
67
68
69

Id.

Council Directive 2019/790, 2019 (L 130/92) (EC).
Id. at art. 15, 17.

ROWLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/7/2022 8:23 PM

COMMENT

821

publications by information society service providers.” 70 Some
have dubbed this provision the “link tax.” 71 Moreover, Article 17
requires that an online content sharing service provider must
first obtain authorization from the authors before communicating
the work to the public. 72 This directive represents a more rigid
approach to enforcing copyright law in the digital sphere that
puts the interests of the authors much more significantly before
those who wish to share content.
The EU stated that a key purpose of the Directive is to
achieve a “well-functioning marketplace for copyright,”
supporting a “reinforced position of right holders to negotiate
and be renumerated for the online exploitation of their content
of video-sharing platforms” and “[r]emuneration of authors and
performers via new transparency rules.” 73 While these policies
seem to be fair on their face, they are actually counterintuitive, as
users of the Internet often post content with the hope that it
ultimately be shared. 74
More concerning, however, is the
response from the service providers affected by this directive.
When Articles 15 and 17 were first proposed, Google lobbied
heavily against them, stating that the company was “very
concerned” about the possible payment rule and would consider
the possibility of shutting down Google News in EU countries
because of it. 75 This would not be a first for Google, in 2014 the
tech company terminated the service in Spain when the Spanish
Government tried to pass a similar law. 76 Over three years after
the passage of the Council Directive, link tax included, no news
70
Id. at art. 15(5). This prohibition does not extend to “private or noncommercial” uses of publications made by individual users. Id. at art 15(1).
71 Luca Handley, Google Warns Its News Site Could Shut Down in Europe If a
New “Link Tax” Goes Ahead, CNBC (Nov. 19, 2018, 12:04 PM), https://perma.cc
/8PCE-CGBU.
72 Council Directive, supra note 68, at art 17(1).
73
European Comm’n, Policy: Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, AN OFFICIAL EU WEBSITE (Jan. 7, 2021, 8:29 PM),
https://perma.cc/486M-QBH6.
74
Steve Olensky, 7 Ways to Up Your Chances of Going Viral on Social Media,
FORBES (Feb. 6, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://perma.cc/TP6L-6UCN (“[social media sites]
have also made it substantially easier to develop a following by going viral”).
75 Handley, supra note 71.
76 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Google is Prepared to Ruthlessly Shut Down its News
Service If It Is Stung by Sweeping New European Internet Laws, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Nov. 19, 2018, 6:36 AM), https://perma.cc/9SDG-MWYG.
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has emerged of Google closing its service.77 Regardless, Google’s
concerns reflect a concern of many service providers, especially
news aggregation sites, and show the overall issue with
unapologetically pro-author policies. 78 Focusing too heavily on
protecting the author’s rights at the expense of those who are
responsible for the dissemination of content online threatens to
legislate away an important element of the Internet. If Google is
any indicator, implementing a system such as the one used in
Spain in the United States would likely be highly unpopular.
As Goldman and Menzel show, continuing adherence to the
Server Test as controlling authority in framing cases is unlikely.
An alternate solution is, therefore, necessary.
A. Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) is
called the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act. 79 Adding one section to the Copyright Act, it has the
purpose of encouraging authors to make their work “readily
available” on the Internet and provides “reasonable assurance
that they will be protected against massive piracy.” 80 The new
provision in the Copyright Act contains a safe harbor for Internet
service providers that remove infringing materials upon receiving
a valid “take-down notice.” 81 For the safe harbor to shield the
service provider, several elements must be met. 82 The DMCA was
Council Directive, supra note 68.
See Mike Cherney, Facebook Reaches Deal with Australia to Restore News,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2021, 4:32 AM), https://perma.cc/5ZL2-8BDJ (discussing
Facebook reaching a deal with Australia after pulling news from platform in the
country after legislation passed requiring Facebook and Google to pay for content
created by traditional media companies).
79 Nimmer, supra note 5 at (C)(1).
80 Nimmer, supra note 5 at (C)(1); see generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
81 1 ASSOC.’S GUIDE TO THE PRAC. OF COPYRIGHT L. § 4.01 (2019); see 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(1)(A) (defining “service provider” as “an entity offering the transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received”).
82
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). Protection from safe harbor requires service
provider not having actual knowledge of the allegedly infringing material or
activity using same, not being aware of facts or circumstances where the
infringement is apparent, acting expeditiously to remove or disable access to
material upon receiving knowledge or awareness of the material or activities, not
77
78
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the United States’ attempt in the 1990s to address the tension
mentioned by Goldman’s amici.83 If service providers were
granted some shields from liability, they would be less hesitant
about allowing content to be posted on their websites and would
be better equipped to avoid the “suing out of existence” issue
that concerned Goldman’s amici and Nimmer. 84
Some commentators believe that the DMCA would be an
effective replacement for the Server Test. One reason is that
Section 512(d) of the DMCA would shield service providers from
liability for “referring or linking users to an online location
containing infringing material or infringing activity.” 85 This
approach only works, however, if the courts interpret the DMCA
to cover embedded hyperlinks that frame an author’s content on
the service provider’s website. 86 It is not guaranteed that courts
will automatically extend Section 512(d) to cover such links
because the statute itself explicitly describes links that direct users
away from the service provider’s site.87 Embedding infringing
material on a service provider’s website is what the defendants in
Goldman had done. 88
receiving financial benefits directly attributable to the infringing activity if it can
control the activity, and posting contact information for a designated agent in a
public spot on the website and providing same information to the Copyright Office
with appropriate identifying information. Id.
83
See Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Nimmer supra note 5, at (C)(1) (ease of sharing digital works may
give copyright owners pause before posting works on the Internet, but “having a
profusion of copyrighted works available will not serve anyone’s interest if the
Internet’s backbone and infrastructure are sued out of existence for involvement in
purportedly aiding copyright infringement.”); see also Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (stating in preamble that
DMCA was intended “to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty”).
84 See Goldman, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 593; Nimmer, supra note 5 at (C)(1).
85
Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo¸ Embedding Content or Interring
Copyright: Does the Internet Need the “Server Rule”?, 42 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 417,
445–46 (Summer 2019); see also, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (applying safe harbor for
“infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to
an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory index, reference, pointer, or
hypertext link”).
86 Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 445–46.
87
17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (“referring or linking users to an online location
containing infringing material or infringing activity”).
88 Goldman, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 586. Judge Forrest did mention that there was
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Another reason that commentators believe that the DMCA
would be an effective replacement for the Server Test is due to
the existence of Section 512(c), which provides a shield from
infringement liability for the storage “at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider.” 89 Some argue that
“material” here should be interpreted broadly to include links. 90
This would provide a benefit to service providers such that they
would have no proactive duty to seek out infringing material
posted by users of their sites, absent constructive knowledge of
the presence of infringing materials. 91 One weakness of this
approach, however, is that it only addresses the liability of
qualifying service providers.92 A common social media user may
still face liability, and while lawsuits against single social media
users are rare because it is more costly than simply filing a takedown notice to the service provider, 93 this does not detract from
the necessity of addressing the legal questions surrounding
liability for all Internet users.94
Another issue with using the DMCA as a replacement for the
Server Test is that it does not clarify what constitutes
infringement; it only addresses shields for what would otherwise
be infringement. 95 In Perfect 10, the court used the Sever Test to
determine whether infringement existed in the first place. 96 It
was not an affirmative defense. 97
With the DMCA as a
the possibility that a DMCA defense may be successful in similar cases. Id. at 596.
89
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Certain conditions must be met in order to qualify for
this safe harbor; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A); Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 460.
90 Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 460.
91 Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 461.
92
Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 457; See also Jie Lian, Twitter Users Beware:
The Display and Performance Rights, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 227, 263–64 (2019).
93 Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 457–58.
94 One commentator stated that under § 512(d), if the social media user shares
content through links on platforms that do not cache copies of content that a user
links to, the DMCA may provide a defense in “the unlikely claim of direct
infringement.” Ginsburg, supra note 85, at 458. This, however, seems to be an
overly complicated approach because a user is not likely to know what the platforms
they are utilizing caches and what they do not cache.
95 Lian, supra note 92, at 264–65.
96
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159–60 (9th Cir.
2007) (citing Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 839 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
97 Id.
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replacement approach, there appears to be a presumption
of infringement.98 Additionally, the level of knowledge necessary
to eliminate the availability of the safe harbor can be
interpreted differently by the various circuits.
This may
impede the development of a swift and orderly replacement
of the Server Test doctrine that proponents of this use of the
DMCA support.99
While the DMCA protects authors from needing to file
actions against each infringing user and can provide
protection for those who, in good faith, host or refer users to
places with infringing materials, it is insufficient as a basis for
determining what
constitutes
infringement
itself
and
threatens
to
be
overinclusive in scope and effect.
Additionally, even if it were able to definitively define
infringement and constructive knowledge, questions remain
as to whether courts would accept that Section 512(d) extends
to embedded content in addition to referential links.
Therefore, the DMCA is not the appropriate replacement for
the Server Test.
B. The Fair Use Defense as a Solution
One approach to replacing the Server Test could be the fair
use defense, codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. 100 The
defense permits certain uses that would otherwise be an
infringement of an author’s exclusive rights.101 There are four
factors that courts must weigh when confronted with a fair use
issue:
Lian, supra note 92, at 263–64.
Lian, supra note 92, at 264–65. Outside the purview of this Comment, this
also threatens to insufficiently protect the First Amendment rights of those who
embed content because the risk-averse service providers may have minimum
internal standards set to determine the threshold required to remove content. Id.
at 265. In so doing, the DMCA for the purpose of replacing the Server Test
threatens to be overinclusive and remove large amounts of non-infringing content.
100 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use”).
101
Id. (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”).
98
99
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(1) the purpose and character of the use . . .; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. 102
This defense was successfully argued in Perfect 10, where the
thumbnails that were stored on Google’s servers constituted fair
use. 103 Although it was successfully raised in a similar issue to
framing, using the fair use defense will not serve as an adequate
replacement for the Server Test. 104
First, the defense of fair use will be an inefficient means of
addressing the issue of framing. As an affirmative defense that
deliberately calls for a highly fact-specific analysis, relying on it to
proactively define whether a specific act of framing is copyright
infringement would encourage an act-first, ask-later environment
that would not provide any structural remedy to the question. 105
Additionally, the fair use defense is unevenly interpreted among
the circuits; reliance on a doctrine with such uncertainty in
addressing the already confusing question of framing is unlikely
to promote clarity. 106
Second, even if the fair use doctrine were an accepted
standard for determining whether framing is a copyright
infringement, it is not guaranteed that mere embedding of
102
103

2007).

Id.

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–69 (9th Cir.

104 Recall that in Perfect 10, the Server Test was only applied to the photos that
appeared once a thumbnail was clicked. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160, 1163–69. See
generally Caroline E. Kim, Insta-Infringement: What is a Fair Use on Social
Media?, 18 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 102, 121 (2018) (calling for a
restatement or comment to Section 107 to clarify fair use on social media).
105
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Ginsburg,
supra note 85, at 430 n.64; Ryan McNamara, Technically, It Wasn’t Me: How a

Questionable Finding of Copyright Infringement May Chill Journalism in the
Social Media Age, 93 TUL. L. REV. 1259 (May 2019) (“The United States Supreme
Court has directed lower courts to evaluate a defendant's claim of fair use on an ad
hoc basis, which has led to unpredictable results.”).
106 McNamara, supra note 105 at 1259.
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another author’s work would satisfy the elements of the defense.
For instance, a principal analysis that is required for the defense
is determining whether a copied work is “transformative.” 107
Depending on the circuit, this can be a high bar. For example,
in the Second Circuit—the circuit in which the Southern District
of New York decided Goldman—the transformative standard
frequently turns on whether the original work serves as “‘raw
material’ in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative
objectives.” 108 While transformative use is not the only factor, and
while it is possible for a copying to be fair use without being
transformative, it can render the other factors less important. 109
Given this high bar and the different applications of the various
circuits, it is unclear whether the mere recreating of a post on a
third-party website, as was done in Goldman, would satisfy the
elements of the defense. At best, it is a highly cumbersome
approach for replacing the Server Test.
C. Statutory Exemptions from Liability
While the DMCA and Fair Use defense prove to be
ineffective replacements for the Server Test, other remedies, such
as a carveout in the Copyright Act, remain. Some suggest adding
such a carveout through an amendment to Section 110 of the
Copyright Act. 110
Section 110 provides limitations on the
performance and display rights enumerated in Section 106 of the
Copyright Act. 111 Section 106 expressly lists Section 110 as a
limiting section of its provisions. 112 As such, Section 110 states

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (asking whether the work “adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is ‘transformative.’”).
108
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Cariou v.
Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (determining that a work was
transformative because it was “fundamentally different and new compared to [the
original work]”).
109 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
110
17 U.S.C. § 110 (“Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Exemption of Certain
Performances and Displays.”).
111
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (stating the copyright owner has the exclusive right
to undertake and authorize the display of the copyrighted work publicly).
112 Id. (“[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122”).
107
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that it is “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106.” 113
Therefore, this section would be a logical place to implement an
exemption on the performance and display exclusive rights. 114
One commentator suggested adding a clause to the end of
Section 110. 115 It would read:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the
following are not infringements of copyright . . .
(12) performance or display of a work on a
computing device in a digital network through a
webpage embedding the work unless (A)(i) the
owner of the work implements a technological
protocol to prevent others from unauthorized
access to the work and (ii) the operator of the
webpage knows or has reason to know the work is
protected by the technological protocol and
bypasses the technological protocol to embed the
work without the owner’s authorization; or (B) the
operator of the webpage knows or has reason to
know the embedded work is an infringing copy
that is not exempted [under this section]. 116
Such a provision would create a presumption of legitimacy for all
framing, rebuttable only if the embedded material circumvents
technological measures and the webpage operator knew or
should have known that such protocols were in place. 117 The
principal issue with such an amendment to the Copyright Act is
that it introduces a statutory knowledge element to the idea of
infringement, which many courts consider to be a strict liability
issue.118 Adding a knowledge factor to a test that typically
113
114
115
116
117
118

17 U.S.C. § 110.

See Lian, supra note 92, at 269–70.
See Lian, supra note 92, at 269.
Lian, supra note 92, at 269–70.
See Lian, supra note 92, at 271.
See Boehm v. Zimprich, 68 F. Supp. 3d 969, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2014)

(“Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense: a defendant is liable for
infringement regardless of whether he intended to infringe.”); see also Costar Grp.,
Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780, 787 (D. Md. 2000) (“Distinction
between negligent and intentional infringement is irrelevant for purposes of
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foregoes that analysis threatens to create scattered results
throughout the circuits, similar to the constructive knowledge
requirement under the DMCA approach above. While the anticircumvention element is a good approach to this issue, its
function within this statute creates a rigid and bright-line policy
for a very rapidly changing field. 119 Therefore, it should be
coupled with the implied license doctrine, discussed below.
IV.

Proposed Solution: Continuing the Use of the
Implied License Doctrine and Incorporating
Anti-Circumvention Measures

The Internet, like technology generally, is ever-evolving and,
as such, should not be subject to bright-line rules that could
become obsolete in only a few years. A judicial approach,
coupled with statutory anti-circumvention measures, is a good
way to balance the interests of authors and service providers
while being able to adjust quickly to new technology.
An implied license, as the name suggests, is a license that is
implied based on objective conduct required to appropriately
enjoy the use of a work. 120 Usually, one who receives a
copyrighted work through proper means “also receives an
implied, nonexclusive license to copy, adapt, perform or display
it to the extent necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the
work was acquired from the copyright owner.” 121 Such licenses
may be granted orally or when the “totality of the parties’
liability”); Educational Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (“No need to prove anything about a defendant’s mental state to establish
copyright infringement; it is a strict liability tort.”); Innovation Ventures, LLC v.
Ultimate One Distrib. Corp., No. 12-CV-5354 (KAM) (RLM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
223536, *43-44 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017) (“trademark infringement and copyright
infringement are strict liability offenses, such that there is no requirement of
knowledge or willfulness to establish liability. However, a finding of willfulness with
respect to trademark or copyright infringement may warrant an enhancement in
awarding statutory damages”).
119 See discussion of anti-circumvention, infra note 150.
120
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACS.
§ 1008.3(D) (3d ed. 2017) (citing Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555,
558 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (“finding an implied license where the author created
special effects for a horror movie and stated that the footage would be used for this
purpose in both a written agreement and in its application to register the
footage”)).
121 1 Milgrim on Licensing § 5.41 (2022).
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conduct” indicates an intent to grant such permission.122 One
common example of this doctrine is handing over architectural
plans to a construction company to build a structure. 123 While
there is contention about what judges should look for when they
are examining the existence of an implied license, three elements
have enjoyed varying acceptance throughout the circuits. 124 In
general, they are: (1) a licensee calls for the creation of a work;
(2) a licensor creates the work and delivers it to the licensee; and
(3) the licensor intends that the licensee will copy and distribute
the work. 125 The various circuits do not consider that to be a
settled test, however, as some opt for the simple “totality of
conduct” analysis. 126 The Fourth Circuit, for example, also
analyzes whether the creators’ conduct alone indicates that the
use of the material without the creator’s involvement or consent
was permissible. 127 Other courts have held that there is no
requirement of direct contact between the licensor and licensee
for there to be an implied license. 128
Some limiting characteristics of implied licenses are that
objection can be used as a valid means to rebut the creation of
such a license.129 Similarly, failure to file a suit for infringement
of copyright does not constitute the grant of an implied license. 130
Additionally, the scope of an implied license is typically narrow
and restricted to the purpose that the licensor and licensee would
reasonably expect to constitute the intended purpose.131

122
123
124
125
126
127

3 Nimmer on Copyright § 10.03(7) (2022).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id . (citing Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505,

516 (4th Cir. 2002).
128 Nimmer § 10.03, supra note 122, at (7) (citing National Ass’n for Stock Car
Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle, 356 F. Supp. 2d 515, 526–27 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d
unpub ., 184 Fed. App’x 270 (3d Cir. 2006) (“This court can find no case that injects
a privity requirement into the implied license doctrine, and it declines to be the
first to do so.”)).
129 Licensing of Intellectual Property § 3.04 (2021).
130 Id.
131 Id. (citing Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. Lock Tech. Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
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In the context of the Internet, “a variety of factors may be
relevant in determining whether a copyright owner published
website content by impliedly authorizing users to make copies of
that content.” 132 Such factors can include indications on the
website that the work in question may be distributed by way of
emailing, downloading, or saving; whether the author expressly
reserved his or her exclusive rights in the work or expressly
forbade reproduction or distribution of the work; whether
barriers are deployed that prevent reproduction or distribution;
and whether the author expressly permits certain activities, but
not others. 133
Following the ideas promulgated above, in Field v. Google, 134
the court held that “[c]onsent to use the copyrighted work need
not be manifested verbally and may be inferred based on silence
where the copyright holder knows of the use and encourages
it.” 135 In this case, the plaintiff attempted to argue that Google
was infringing on his exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution by allowing Internet users to access copies of his
work that were stored in a repository. 136 In addition to finding
estoppel and fair use, Judge Jones found that the implied license
doctrine applied to this case because the original author “chose
not to include the no-archive meta-tag on the pages of his site.
He did so, knowing that Google would interpret the absence of
the meta-tag as permission to allow access to the pages via
‘Cached’ links.” 137 Because the plaintiff knew that this was how
Google works, and he knew that he could prevent such use
through the meta tags on his website, his conduct would lead one
to reasonably believe that a license was granted to Google for that
use. 138
The implied license doctrine is most threatened by the
decision that was handed down in Goldman and would be
similarly harmed by a move away from the Server Test in favor of
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Compendium, supra note 120, at 1008.3(D).
Compendium, supra note 120, at 1008.3(D).
Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
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more aggressive pro-author policies, such as those seen in the
EU. 139 It is, however, the best way to address the complexities of
balancing the needs of the author with those of the content
sharers because it allows judges to objectively look at situations to
determine the conduct of the licensee and licensor. The largest
issue, however, is the fact that implied licenses, being a function
of contract law, are subject to the laws of individual states. 140 A
more unified standard is needed.
Anti-circumvention is an idea that was discussed in the
statutory exemption solution proposed above, as well as in
Field. 141 It is the idea that an author who creates a technological
barrier to his or her work to prevent it from being freely
distributable and displayable can successfully rebut the argument
that an implied license exists. 142 The author in Field, for
example, knew that such a protection existed and that it would
have prevented Google from indexing his page and contents had
it been employed, but he chose not to use it. 143 The exact
restriction was applying the meta-tag “robots.txt.” 144 Per Google’s
developer website, Google uses “crawlers” to automatically
discover and scan websites by jumping between links on the
Internet. 145 The crawlers then index the links for framing on
search result pages. 146 Using the “robots.txt” code in a website’s
metadata allows a user to instruct these crawlers not to index
certain parts of the website, or the website in its entirety. 147 For
instance, if a company does not want the photos of employees on
an “About Us” page to appear on Google Image results, it can
use this code to prevent such use. 148 Because the plaintiff in Field
did not use this mechanism, Google, through its crawlers,
Falkenburg, supra note 1.
Licensing, supra note 129.
141 See generally Lian, supra note 92.
142 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1113–14.
145
See generally Google Developers, Overview of Google Crawlers (User
Agents), GOOGLE SEARCH CENT. (Jan. 8, 2021, 4:10 pm), https://perma.cc/XLE3JNJW (providing an overview of how Google crawlers work to discover and index
search results).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
139
140
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reasonably assumed that the entire page was fair to be indexed.149
It is not a radical idea to incorporate anti-circumvention
measures into copyright law. Indeed, the Copyright Act already
has such a measure in place. 150 Section 1201 provides that “no
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title.” 151 The
statute provides several exemptions from this that are set by the
Librarian of Congress, which extend to “non-profit librarians,
archives, and educational institutions” as well as certain law
enforcement activities.152 This was also a part of the DMCA,
separate from the safe harbor provisions discussed earlier.153 It is
accompanied by various criminal and civil penalties as well. 154
To circumvent under Section 1201, a prima facie case must
be made that:
(1) the defendant “circumvented a technological
measure” by descrambling a scrambled work,
decrypting an encrypted work, or otherwise
avoided, bypassed, removed, deactivated, or
impaired a technological measure, without the
authority of the encrypted work’s copyright owner.
(2) The encrypted work is within the scope of the
DMCA, that is, protected under Title 17 of the
United States Code. (3) The technological measure
circumvented effectively controls access to the
copyrighted work. 155
Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
151 Id.
152
Id. at (d)–(e); see also APPENDIX C. Report of Exemptions to the DMCA
Anticircumvention Provision, Section 1201, L. OF COMPUT. TECH. APPENDIX C (Dec.
149
150

2020) (providing one of the Librarian of Congress’ recent lists of exceptions).
153
See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998).
154
See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (civil remedies include: injunction, impounding of
violating device, damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and “remedial modification or
destruction of [violating device]”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (criminal penalties
include fines up to $500,000 and imprisonment up to five years for first offense,
and fines up to one-million-dollars and imprisonment up to ten years for each
subsequent offense).
155
David Polin, Cause of Action Under Digital Millennium Copyright Act for
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Circumvention needed to give rise to a violation of Section 1201
requires more than merely using deception to gain access. 156 The
intent of the DMCA in this provision is to prevent those who seek
profit by decoding encrypted codes or helping others do so. 157 In
other words, it is not circumvention under Section 1201 for
someone to borrow a friend’s Wall Street Journal login
information to gain access to the opinion section, but it would be
circumvention to decrypt and copy the contents of a DVD. 158 A
certain level of technological bypassing is required under this
particular section, such as “descrambling, decrypting, avoiding,
bypassing, removing, deactivating, or impairing a technological
measure.” 159
Because of the stringent requirements of Section 1201
specifically, it is not the best replacement for the Server Test. It
shows, however, that this is an available remedy that the
Copyright Act has employed in the past, and it can inform the
continuing application of the implied license doctrine. For
instance, when an author sets some type of technological barrier,
such as a paywall, the author can rebut the existence of an
implied license to share the original content.
Any replacement of the Server Test in copyright law should
include a balanced application of the implied license doctrine,
using anti-circumvention measures to determine whether the
author’s conduct warrants a reasonable belief that such a license
to share and embed the content was given. If the author places
any such measures, courts should interpret that as conduct
rebutting the presence of an implied license. If a user then
embeds content by circumventing that mechanism, courts can
interpret that as infringement.

Unauthorized Decryption or Trafficking in Decryption Technology, 18 CAUSES

OF

ACTION 2D 225 (Nov. 2020).
156
Brent A. Olson, DMCA—Anti-Circumvention Under § 1201(a)(1)(A), 20A1
MINN. PRAC., BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 16B:59 (NOV. 2021).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., 307 F. Supp. 2d
532, 522, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
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One way to enshrine this in the Copyright Act would be an
amendment to the DMCA with a provision stating something
such as:
Embedding an author’s work online is not an
infringement of copyright unless the individual
framing third-party content circumvents a
technological device or process pursuant to section
1201 or otherwise makes publicly available a work
that is shielded by a technological device or
process. The absence of any such device or process
shall constitute the granting of an implied license.
The inclusion of this provision removes the intent and knowledge
element discussed above to place the standard more in line with
the strict liability spirit of copyright infringement. 160 If codified
as part of the Copyright Act through the DMCA, this provision
would prevent different circuits from coming to different
standards, providing uniformity. Additionally, removing the
knowledge requirement eliminates the need to determine what
constitutes constructive knowledge. 161
A critique of this approach is that copyright law in the
United States has largely been an “opt-in” system where the onus
is on the one seeking to use another’s work to receive the
authorization, and the author himself or herself has to
affirmatively do something to give such permission, such as grant
an express license. 162 Some critics of extending the implied
license doctrine in such a manner state that it would allow a norm
of infringement to become standard practice, something that
became an issue with Napster in the early 2000s. 163 But the
nature of the Internet is, by default, a place where users freely
browse unless they are restricted from doing so by content
160
161

See Lian, supra note 92, at 269–71.
See generally Lian, supra note 92, at 265 (noting how various circuits have

interpreted the DMCA’s knowledge requirement differently).
162
Monika Isia Jasiewicz, Comment, Copyright Protection in an Opt-Out
World: Implied License Doctrine and News Aggregators, 122 YALE L. J. 837, 843
(2012).
163 Lian, supra note 92, at 268 n.268.
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creators. 164 Google’s use of crawlers is further evidence of this
system. 165 To require an opt-in system for all Internet content is
to rework the entire functioning of the Internet far beyond what
happened in the more unique instance of Napster. 166 Moreover,
it is a mischaracterization of copyright law in the United States to
say that it is exclusively an opt-in system where the author has no
responsibility for protecting his or her exclusive rights. 167 For
example, to bring an action for infringement of a commercially
distributed work, an author must have registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office and paid various fees.168 Concerns that a
continuation of the implied license doctrine supplemented with
anti-circumvention measures would unjustly add greater
responsibility to content creators are misstated.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment discussed the Server Test as it was used in

Perfect 10 and its falling out of favor among various courts within

the United States. With the likely demise of the test, there is a
gap in American copyright law concerning the liability that
individuals, especially service providers such as news aggregators,
face when framing the content of another author on their
website. Some solutions have emerged in other governments,
such as the EU’s link tax, which would require service providers
to pay compensation to authors for the benefit of linking to their
articles. This scheme, however, has caused companies like
Google to threaten to leave the news market in Europe
altogether and, as such, would likely be equally unpopular in the
United States.

Jasiewicz, supra note 162, at 843.
Jasiewicz, supra note 162, at 844; see Google Developers, supra note 145.
166
Lian, supra note 92, at 268 n.268 (“such unauthorized access [in Napster’s
case] clearly fell outside the legally accepted social norm").
167 Jasiewicz, supra note 162, at 846–47.
168
Jasiewicz, supra note 162, at 847; 17 U.S.C. § 408(f)(3)–(4) (“Effect of
untimely application. An action under this chapter . . . for infringement of a work
preregistered under this subsection . . . shall be dismissed if the items described in
paragraph (3) are not submitted to the Copyright Office in the proper form [within
various timeframes then given].”).
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Other commentators have also proposed mechanisms that
currently exist in American copyright law to determine liability
for those framing content. The DMCA’s safe harbor provisions,
for example, are one such mechanism. As discussed above,
however, these mechanisms are not inclusive of average users’
legal liability, threaten overinclusion by overly cautious service
providers of non-infringing materials, and fail to address the
central question of the definition of infringement in this context.
Based on these concerns, utilizing the DMCA’s safe harbor
provisions would be an ineffective replacement for the Server
Test.
Other suggestions involve statutory rights. For instance, one
commentator discussed above touched on the idea of anticircumvention but relied on the idea of a knowledge requirement
for conduct to constitute infringement. Knowledge, however, is
difficult to define, especially on the Internet, and it is contrary to
the spirit of copyright infringement in general. Therefore, while
an effective response to the abandonment of the Server Test is
likely to include statutory language, it should remove any
knowledge elements and be purely strict liability.
While there have been various proposed solutions,
continuing use of the implied license doctrine and using anticircumvention as a guidepost is the best mechanism for
addressing this gap left by the Server Test. Shifting the onus of
responsibility for protection to the author posting the work
online is a more manageable framework for courts to interpret
whether a copying is authorized because it is simpler for an
original author to expressly forbid the copying or to place anticircumvention processes around the work. Anti-circumvention
can be a unified framework that judges can use to determine
whether an implied license exists and whether the copier
infringed on the author’s exclusive rights. If the DMCA were to
be amended to include a provision that more specifically speaks
to anti-circumvention in the context of linking and embedding, it
could serve as a sufficient legal test to address this issue.

